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Supreme Court Declines to Adopt ERISA Presumption of Prudence But Imposes Limits on Stock Drop Claims
June 26, 2014
In Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, No.
12-751 (U.S. June 25, 2014), the Supreme Court rejected a
presumption - previously adopted by most courts of appeal - that
employee stock ownership plan fiduciaries act prudently by
investing plan assets in employer stock. The Court did,
however, issue guidance making clear that many - possibly most -
claims against those fiduciaries may well fail at the pleading
stage.
Background
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA")
governs employee stock ownership plans ("ESOPs"), which are pension
plans designed to invest primarily in the stock of the company that
employs the plan participants. ERISA requires fiduciaries of
all pension plans, including ESOPs, to act prudently in managing
the plan's assets, but ESOPs enjoy an exemption from the normally
imposed requirement of asset diversification. See 29
U.S.C. § 1104(a). In numerous cases, plan participants have
alleged that ESOP fiduciaries acted imprudently by continuing to
invest plan assets in company stock, even as the company
encountered financial difficulties. Most appellate courts had
recognized a presumption that ESOP fiduciaries acted prudently by
investing in company stock. The presumption had been
judicially developed in recognition of an ESOP's special purpose to
invest in the sponsoring employer's common stock. To survive
a motion to dismiss under this standard, plaintiffs had to show
that the fiduciary knew or should have known that the employer's
survival was in serious peril. The presumption effectively
precluded imprudence claims against ESOP fiduciaries based on their
investments in company stock except in extraordinary
circumstances.
Supreme Court's Decision
The Supreme Court unanimously held, based primarily on the text of
ERISA, that "the law does not create a special presumption favoring
ESOP fiduciaries." Instead, the Court held, a claim alleging
that an ESOP fiduciary acted imprudently should be judged according
to the general plausibility pleading standard set forth in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007).
Critically, the Court went on to explain why, even applying this
standard, motions to dismiss would still provide an "important
mechanism for weeding our meritless claims."
Claims against ESOP fiduciaries are necessarily based on
allegations that they should have known that ongoing investment in
company stock was imprudent based on either public or nonpublic
information. The Court appears to have sharply curtailed both
types of claims.
First, the Court held that "allegations that a fiduciary should
have recognized from publicly available information alone that the
market was over- or undervaluing the stock are implausible as a
general rule, at least in the absence of special
circumstances." It reasoned that ESOP fiduciaries are not
obliged to outsmart the market. Fiduciaries can assume that
the market provides the best estimate of a security's price, unless
plaintiffs plausibly allege "a special circumstance affecting the
reliability of the market price."
Second, the Court also held that, to state a claim based on
nonpublic information, "a plaintiff must plausibly allege an
alternative action that the defendant could have taken that would
have been consistent with the securities laws and that a prudent
fiduciary in the same circumstances would not have viewed as more
likely to harm the fund than to help it." The Court made
clear that, under this test, plan participants cannot allege that
ESOP fiduciaries should have sold company stock based on nonpublic
information, because that would require them to violate the
securities laws.
Plaintiffs in Fifth Third alleged that as "alternative
actions," the fiduciaries should have refrained from making further
purchases of company stock or disclosed the nonpublic
information. The Court held that these claims were only
sustainable if plaintiffs "plausibly alleged that a prudent
fiduciary in the defendant's position could not have concluded that
stopping purchases - which the market might take as a sign that
insider fiduciaries viewed the employer's stock as a bad investment
- or publicly disclosing negative information would do more harm
than good to the fund by causing a drop in the stock price and a
concomitant drop in the value of the stock already held by the
fund." It directed the lower courts to determine whether, on
the facts, this standard was met in Fifth Third.
Analysis
The Supreme Court's rejection of the presumption that ESOP
fiduciaries act prudently by investing in company stock may cause
many public companies to reassess whether or not to offer an ESOP
and take the risk of litigation when the stock price
declines.
Nevertheless, Fifth Third makes clear that plan
participants asserting imprudence claims against ESOP fiduciaries
continue to carry a high burden - and this burden will continue to
apply at the pleading stage and be the proper subject of motions to
dismiss.
In light of Fifth Third, it appears that a plan
participant should not be able to survive a motion to dismiss by
alleging, based on public information, that a fiduciary should not
have invested in company stock. It is likely to be the rare
case in which plaintiffs can plausibly allege "a special
circumstance affecting the reliability of the market price," which
was known or should have been known by the defendant
fiduciaries.
Participants may attempt to assert imprudence claims based on the
fiduciary's access to negative nonpublic information, but here will
face the requirement that they identify an "alternative action"
that the fiduciary should and lawfully could have taken based on
that information. In particular, participants can state such a
claim only by plausibly alleging that a prudent fiduciary "could
not have concluded" that the benefits of that alternative action
outweighed its harm. But because the most obvious alternatives in
most cases - stopping additional company stock purchases or
disclosing negative nonpublic information - are likely to cause
significant harm to plan assets, as the Court expressly recognized,
this will likely be a difficult burden for participants to
meet.
The Supreme Court's opinion does not consider how these rules and
considerations will be applied to ESOPs established by private
companies.
* * *
This memorandum is not intended to provide legal advice, and no
legal or business decision should be based on its content.
Questions concerning issues addressed in this memorandum should be
directed to:
Lewis R. Clayton
212-373-3215
lclayton@paulweiss.com
Robert C. Fleder
212-373-3107
rfleder@paulweiss.com
Andrew L. Gaines
212-373-3339
againes@paulweiss.com
Associate Paul A. Paterson contributed to this client alert.